targets of violence. Otis McDonald, a retiree from a rough neighborhood in Chicago, had been threatened by drug dealers, and the Lawsons had been targeted by burglars in their home.
B. Lower Court Opinions
The district court, considering all three cases, rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, noting that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had ''squarely upheld the constitutionality of a ban on handguns a quarter century ago.'' 13 Heller had refrained from ''opin[ing] on the subject of incorporation'' of the Second Amendment, 14 and the district court judge in McDonald noted that he had a ''duty to follow established precedent in the Court of Appeals . . . even though the logic of more recent caselaw may point in a different direction. '' 15 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, deciding against Second Amendment incorporation because of three prior cases. 16 Although the court noted that the rationales of the restrictive 19th-century precedents were ''defunct,'' it did not consider whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment, and declined to predict how the right to keep and bear arms would fare under the Court's modern ''selective incorporation'' jurisprudence. 17 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit pointed to Heller's discussion of Reconstruction-era precedents but carefully avoided quoting the Supreme Court's caveat that those decisions ''did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.'' Only by tip-toeing around this rather obvious admonition to conduct an incorporation analysis could the court of appeals claim fidelity to the Supreme Court's precedents. In this manner, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the 19th-century Supreme Court regarding application of the Second Amendment to the states-but the court was unfaithful to the century of case law that followed, culminating with Heller's instruction to perform a modern due process analysis.
The Seventh Circuit asserted that precedent having direct application must be followed even if it ''rest[s] on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions. '' 18 But the Supreme Court's Reconstructionera decisions hadn't applied the due process incorporation doctrine at all. Indeed, that doctrine would not be invoked by the Supreme Court in securing individual rights for decades following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 The earlier cases thus had no direct application to this question. '' [C] ases cannot be read as foreclosing an argument that they never dealt with.'' 20 ''[W]hen a lower court perceives a pronounced new doctrinal trend in Supreme Court decisions, it is its duty, cautiously to be sure, to follow not to resist it. '' 21 As the Seventh Circuit itself once acknowledged, ''[a] court need not blindly follow decisions that have been undercut by subsequent cases . . . . '' 22 Or, as that same court recognized nearly 30 years ago, sometimes later decisions, though not explicitly overruling or even mentioning an earlier decision, indicate that the Court very probably will not decide the issue the same way the next time. In such a case, to continue to follow the earlier case blindly until it is formally overruled is to apply the dead, not the living, law.
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Time and again, courts have rejected a result under one theory, only to adopt the same result under another. For example, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the mandatory federal sentencing 18 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) . 19 See, e.g., Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora's Box Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms to the States, 8 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1, 57-59 (2010) (''Indeed, the concept of [selective due process] 'incorporation' was anachronistically inserted into our Constitutional jurisprudence decades after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.''). 20 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678 (1994) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 21 but that did not stop the Seventh Circuit from sustaining a similar challenge under the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial-and the Supreme Court affirmed. 25 This has been the history of due process incorporation. Virtually all rights selectively incorporated under the Due Process Clause had at one point been denied incorporation or application against the states under other theories. 26 And the lower federal courts had a leading role in incorporating some of these rights, without awaiting a green light from the Supreme Court. 27 Instead, the Seventh Circuit followed a non-binding line of cases, ignored Heller's directive to apply later cases, and excluded the Second Amendment from the broad application given other rights. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit-in a case that may yet come before the Supreme Court-recognized Heller's pro-incorporation signal and found that the Second Amendment secured fundamental rights incorporated through the Due Process Clause. 28 Presaging the framework that Justice Samuel Alito would use in McDonald, the Ninth Circuit applied Washington v. Glucksberg and determined that because the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right, ''meaning, 'necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty''' and ''deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'' the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment. 29 24 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) . 25 the Privileges or Immunities Clause-which was understood and intended to bind the states to national civil rights standards-to extend the Second Amendment to the states. To be sure, there may have been a technical conception of ''substantive'' due process among some 19th-century legal scholars. 33 But there was no evidence-none-that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the Due Process Clause to transmit substantive rights (beyond the bare minimum needed to prevent ''due process of law'' from becoming a kangaroo court). Nor was there any evidence that the clause's authors believed it contained such powers.
Thus, the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment plainly favored applying Privileges or Immunities, not ''substantive'' due process. That should have mattered to the Court and, therefore, to the litigants. Justice Antonin Scalia recently put it this way:
Twenty years ago, when I joined the Supreme Court, I was the only originalist among its numbers. By and large, counsel did not know I was an originalist-and indeed, probably did not know what an originalist was. In their briefs and oral arguments on constitutional issues they generally discussed only the most recent Supreme Court cases and policy considerations; not a word about what the text was thought to mean when the people adopted it. If any light was to be shed on the latter question, it would be through research by me and my law clerks. Today, the secret is out that I am an originalist, and there is even a second one sitting with me, Justice Clarence Thomas. including, most notably, Heller's author. In the last major civil rights case reaching the Court from Chicago, Justice Scalia famously derided substantive due process as an ''atrocity'' and an act of ''judicial usurpation.'' 35 It would have been folly to assume that this Court had on it five votes for substantive due process incorporation.
Indeed, ultimately, as we all now know, there were not five votes. Whatever its merits or ultimate level of acceptance among the justices, substantive due process incorporation had one unique feature: it was familiar. The Court had been down this well-worn path many times before. The Seventh Circuit avoided incorporating the Second Amendment on due process grounds only by avoiding the question. For the Supreme Court, the question of whether to incorporate the Second Amendment on due process grounds would merely be a test of the justices' commitment to existing incorporation principles. Either they believed in it, or they didn't; they would either apply the familiar standards to the Second Amendment or alter those familiar standards to make an anti-gun exception. Either way, it would be a poor use of litigation resources to beat the drum on a theory where every justice's vote, whatever it might be, was a foregone conclusion.
Or was it? Maybe those justices unwilling to carry originalism to its logical result-defining the right to bear arms as one of the privileges or immunities of citizenship-would nonetheless utilize originalist grounds in an exercise of substantive due process noseholding. That is, some faint-hearted originalist justices generally hostile to substantive due process might vote for due process incorporation if they could be convinced that the outcome was historically correct. There is strong evidence that this occurred among the McDonald plurality. 36 Accordingly, the failure to make a strong originalist case could have seriously jeopardized the outcome. Justices unrepentantly hostile to substantive due process might not have forged their own 35 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 85 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2607-08 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (attacking as vague and undefined Justice Anthony Kennedy's use of substantive due process to protect against judicial takings). 36 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3033 n.9 (Alito, J., plurality opinion) (referencing Privileges or Immunities sources); id. at 3050-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
originalist path unless meaningfully asked to do so by the petitioners. In Gonzales v. Carhart, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the federal partial-birth abortion ban against a substantive due process challenge. 37 Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas, predictably, were not enthusiastic about the doctors' due process abortion-rights claim. But this pair was also skeptical of congressional power to regulate abortion under the Commerce Clause-Justice Thomas having endorsed the idea that ''health laws of every description'' were ''not surrendered to a general government. ' 46 McDonald's counsel repeatedly and emphatically explained to certain conservative lawyers (1) the concerns-validated by the case's outcome-about the potential lack of five votes for substantive due process incorporation; (2) the utility-also demonstrated by the result-of an originalist argument in swaying votes even for due process incorporation; and (3) the benefits-realized-of attracting support to the case from non-traditional allies. Regrettably, political hostility to restoring the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning and irrational fears about the consequences of doing so could not always be overcome. 
II. Split Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held in a 4-1-4 split that the Constitution guarantees the right to keep and bear arms for all individuals regardless of where in the country they live. How the Court got there is a little more complicated.
Justice Alito, writing for the plurality on behalf of Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that the Second Amendment was incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Justice Scalia concurred and also wrote separately to dispute much of Justice John Paul Stevens's dissent (much as he had in the term's other big case, Citizens United
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). Justice Thomas did not join in most of Justice Alito's opinion, but he concurred in the judgment, thereby providing the all-important fifth vote for incorporation. While Thomas agreed that the right to keep and bear arms should be applied to the states, and agreed that the right is ''fundamental,'' he found that this fundamental right was properly extended to the states by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Justice Stevens dissented. No one else joined his opinion. Stevens found that the Second Amendment should not be incorporated and, even if it were, it need not provide as much protection to people of the states as it provides to people in federal enclaves. Justice Stephen Breyer also dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor. Breyer argued that (1) Heller was wrongly decided; (2) the Second Amendment should not be incorporated; and (3) McDonald would result in more crime and violence.
A. Justice Alito's Plurality Opinion
The bulk of Justice Alito's opinion focused on the history of the right to keep and bear arms from revolutionary times to Reconstruction and attempted to apply that history-and what it says about the nature of the right-to incorporation doctrine. Justice Alito observed that the Court had never embraced the ''total incorporation to t[he] academic debate'' over this theory. 49 He continued to sketch the evolution of the Court's disjointed due process jurisprudence and noted that the Warren Court-the Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren in the 1950s and '60s-initiated ''what has been called a process of 'selective incorporation''' wherein the Court held that the ''Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments.'' 50 These opinions ''inquired whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.'' 51 Alito proceeded to list all the rights that had been incorporated under the Due Process Clause and the rights that had not been incorporated-most importantly, the Second Amendment. Third, citing the standard from Duncan v. Louisiana, Justice Alito remarked that ''during this era the Court 'can be seen as having 49 McDonald, 130 S. Ct., at 3033 n.10. 50 Id. at 3034 (citations omitted). 51 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14. 52 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034-35 n.12. 53 Id. at 3031. 54 Id. (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908)). 55 Id. 56 Id. Layout : 24622A : Odd asked, when inquiring into whether some particular procedural safeguard was required of a State, if a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular protection.''' 58 By accepting this broader rationale of due process, the Court was able to reconcile the precedent of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, which held that states cannot violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, even though the provision was never explicitly ''incorporated.'' 59 Fourth, the Court found that some rights had ''failed to meet the test for inclusion''; the rights of freedom of speech and press, assistance of counsel in capital cases, freedom of assembly, and free exercise ''qualified,'' while others, such as to grand jury indictment, ''did not'' qualify. 60 Fifth, even for rights in the Bill of Rights that ''f[ell] within the conception of due process, the protection or remedies afforded against state infringement sometimes differed from the protection or remedies'' provided against federal infringement.
61 However, the two examples Justice Alito gave of rights applying differently to the state and federal governments-the right of appointed counsel 62 After considering this century-long train of precedents, Justice Alito concluded that the Court ''must decide whether the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty or as we have said in a related context, whether this right is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' '' 68 According to the plurality, the Court's ''decision in Heller points unmistakably to the answer'': yes. 69 Repeating Heller's holding, Justice Alito recounted that ''individual self-defense is 'the central component' of the Second Amendment'' and ''citizens must be permitted 'to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.' '' 70 He then recited that the right described in Heller is ''deeply rooted in this Nation's history and traditions'' 71 The plurality's treatment of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, meanwhile, was uncharacteristically curt. First, the plurality acknowledged that ''many legal scholars dispute the correctness of the narrow Slaughterhouse interpretation. '' 72 Second, the Court noted that petitioners wanted the Court to overrule Slaughterhouse and ''hold that the right to keep and bear arms is one of the 'privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.''' 73 Third, the Court remarked that while the petitioners contend that the ''Privileges or 66 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.14. 67 Id. at 3047 (citing Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11) (internal quotation marks omitted). 68 Id. at 3036 (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149, and Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 69 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036. 70 Id. (citing Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2081-82, 2818). 71 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 72 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3029. This is an understatement akin to noting that ''many'' astrophysicists believe the Earth is essentially round and revolves around the Sunbut nevertheless an important first step in overcoming the Slaughterhouse Court's medieval view, as it were, of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 73 Id. at 3030 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1, cl. 2). That's all, folks.
This short treatment is indeed remarkable. Regardless of the unknowable politics behind the adoption of petitioners' question presented, the Court did take that question. To exert merely 172 words on such a profound topic, barely acknowledging the proverbial elephant in the room in light of Justice Thomas's lengthy, historic concurrence seems odd.
Furthermore, that nobody can agree on the Privileges or Immunities Clause's full scope is hardly a reason to ignore it. The Fourteenth Amendment's authors refused to define its full scope, too. Introducing the amendment on the Senate floor, Michigan's Jacob Howard declared, To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may befor they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature-to these should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight 74 Id. 75 Id. Of course, to continue the metaphor from note 72, supra, astrophysicists adopting the Copernican view rather than the Ptolemaic still disagree among themselves regarding, for example, whether Pluto is a planet. 76 Id. 
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If the amendment's framers were not bothered by the inability to fully delineate the clause's scope, why should the Supreme Court be? Justice Robert Jackson had already replied to the McDonald plurality's concern nearly 70 years ago:
[T]he difficulty of the task does not excuse us from giving these general and abstract words whatever of specific content and concreteness they will bear as we mark out their application, case by case. That is the method of the common law, and it has been the method of this Court with other no less general statements in our fundamental law.
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The argument would have quickly devolved into a circus had petitioners attempted to do what the Fourteenth Amendment's framers believed impossible and sought to offer a complete litany of rights included and excluded from the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The petitioners themselves had never considered, never mind agreed on, the full scope of the liberty protected by the amendment. Indeed, whether a particular right is or is not within the amendment is always a serious question warranting careful examination and deliberation; no Supreme Court case considering an unenumerated right has ever been a casual exercise.
Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court happily announces new rules, including on occasion heretofore unknown rights, while never taking such opportunity to fully describe the scope of the relevant constitutional text, renders the sudden insistence on learning the Privileges or Immunities Clause's full catalog incongruent with the Court's approach to constitutional interpretation. ' Refusing to interpret the relevant constitutional text in reaching as groundbreaking a decision as the application of the right to bear arms against the states takes a jarring leap of logic. As Professor Mark Tushnet observed in Heller's wake:
The debates over the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption are replete with comments that one of the Amendment's benefits would be to ensure that the South's freedmen would be able to protect themselves from marauding whites by guaranteeing their own right to arm themselves. The only embarrassment is a doctrinal one: all these references described the right to keep and bear arms as one of the privileges of the citizenship that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed, and contemporary incorporation doctrine rests not on the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather on its due process clause. Justice Scalia's acquiescence in a theory he has recently termed ''babble,'' ''usurpation,'' and even an ''atrocity,'' as part of his veritable holy war on behalf of originalism is startling enough. We now learn that Justice Scalia only has ''misgivings'' about substantive due process as an original matter and it is suddenly acceptable to ''acquiesce'' in the theory because it is ''long established''? Imagine a hypothetical Supreme Court in the year 2073, with Roe v. Wade on the docket for reconsideration, and Justice Scalia, perhaps by virtue of the recent health care reform law, still advocating originalism from the bench. Would he acquiesce in Roe on its 100th birthdaycoincidentally the 200th birthday of Slaughterhouse-because it 88 Id. at 1. 89 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). 92 But, he added: ''There are some opinions that I do not accept. I think the most important criteria for me are, probably in ascending order, number one, how wrong was it? I mean there are some of them that are blatantly and maliciously wrong. '' 93 This is an apt description of Slaughterhouse. Just five years after the 39th Congress labored to pass the Fourteenth Amendment, Slaughterhouse eviscerated the intent and purpose of the central part of that amendment, the Privileges or Immunities Clause. As the preponderance of modern scholarship shows, this interpretation was at least ''blatantly'' wrong, if not indeed ''malicious,'' as were the decision's original propounders. 94 In McDonald, as we discuss below, Justice Thomas reviewed this scholarship and concluded that the 90 Slaughterhouse Cases had been wrongly decided and should be overruled. 95 In his opinion, however, Justice Scalia ignored Justice Thomas's able recounting of the errors of Slaughterhouse. But Scalia has another consideration when choosing stare decisis over originalism: the second point in his speech was, ''how well has it been accepted?'' 96 As an example, Scalia offers the incorporation doctrine, which he thinks is ''probably wrong, but I wouldn't go back. ' 104 At oral argument, Scalia asked petitioners' counsel whether he was troubled that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would allow judges to enforce unenumerated rights. Counsel answered that the Court has already enforced some unenumerated rights, suggesting that reinvigorating the Privileges or Immunities Clause would not threaten the Court's established practices.
105 Scalia was not comforted. More critically, of course, the enforcement of unenumerated rights would not have troubled the Framers. To the contrary, the Framers would have been disappointed in a timid judiciary that bends to the will of the political branches and shies from the trust placed in it by Article III to safeguard the Constitution. 106 The Framers of the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights explicitly endorsed-in the Ninth Amendment-the idea that some rights could not be enumerated. The Fourteenth Amendment's framers similarly codified language they understood to encompass a range of rights that could not be fully cataloged. 107 This is where Justice Scalia steps off the originalist bus.
108 Regardless of how ''blatantly and maliciously wrong'' a precedent might be, or how poorly accepted it is, Justice Scalia seems unwilling to bury its pernicious doctrine-perhaps because that process would call on him to engage in an historical exploration of which rights are to be enforced, rather than merely how rights are to be enforced.
Moreover, McDonald did not supply the only occasion during the 2009-10 term that Justice Scalia dealt with the scope and meaning of substantive due process. In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Justice Scalia wrote for a plurality that chided Justice Kennedy's use of substantive due process to protect against judicial takings.
109 While holding that the Florida Supreme Court did not commit a judicial taking when it ruled that beachfront property owners did not have the right for their property to contact the waterline, Scalia rightly chose the Takings Clause as the proper clause under which takings-judicial or otherwiseshould be reviewed. He also gave an accurate critique of substantive due process as a ''wonderfully malleable'' concept to which the ''firm commitment to apply it would be a firm commitment to nothing in particular. '' 110 Instead, Scalia argues, textual provisions should be followed if germane textual provisions are available.
111 Indeed they should, and the same reasoning applies to Justice Scalia's dismissal of the germane textual provision-the Privileges or Immunities Clause-at issue in McDonald. , 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2606-08 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 110 Id. at 2608. 111 Id. at 2606 (''Where a particular Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ''substantive due process,'' must be the guide for analyzing these claims.''' (citations omitted)). The remainder of Justice Scalia's opinion addresses the philosophy advanced by Justice Stevens's dissent-''a broad condemnation of the theory of interpretation which underlies the Court's opinion, a theory that makes the traditions of our people paramount.'' 113 Scalia criticizes Stevens for excluding the right to keep and bear arms from incorporation, despite its being as ''deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition as a right can be,'' while including other rights lacking historical grounding, simply because he ''deeply believes it should be out.'' 114 Scalia also disparages Stevens's ''subjective'' conception of the Due Process Clause, which gives the court a ''prerogative'' and ''duty'' to update the Constitution ''so that it encompasses new freedoms the Framers were too narrow-minded to imagine. '' 115 Justice Scalia thus revisits the debate between the ''living Constitution'' approach to jurisprudence and originalism. He concludes that the issue ''is not whether the historically focused method is a perfect means of restraining aristocratic judicial Constitution-writing; but whether it is the best means available in an imperfect world. '' 116 In other words, originalism is the least worst option because it is ''much less subjective, and intrudes much less upon the democratic process. '' 117 But ultimately, Justice Scalia's familiar observations ring hollow, coming as they do as a lengthy postscript to his declaration preferring application of substantive due process-a doctrine requiring him to apply those rights, and only those rights that he believes are fundamental-while scorning an originalist approach based on historical analysis of how the Fourteenth Amendment's framers understood the text they ratified. Justice Scalia could have demonstrated fidelity to the judicial method he would use to attack Justice Stevens by joining Justice Thomas's concurrence.
C. Justice Thomas's Pivotal Concurrence
''I believe this case presents an opportunity to re-examine, and begin the process of restoring, the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment agreed upon by those who ratified it.'' 118 With these words, Justice Thomas broke with the plurality, turned to face the stark reality of the Fourteenth Amendment's central text, and launched an analysis that promises to fundamentally restore the proper relationship between Americans and their state governments.
Justice Thomas ''agree [d] with the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to keep and bear arms'' applicable to the states, but ''wr[ote] separately because I believe there is a more straightforward path to this conclusion, one that is more faithful to the Fourteenth Amendment's text and history. '' 119 Though Thomas concurred with the result reached by the plurality, he argued that the right to keep and bear arms cannot be enforceable against the states through a clause that ''speaks only to 'process.''' 120 Rather, ''the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.'' 121 Justice Thomas's opinion explores the right to keep and bear arms through the prism of the expansive notions of freedom, liberty, and equality vindicated by the Reconstruction amendments, ''which were adopted to repair the Nation from the damage slavery had caused. '' 122 The Privileges or Immunities Clause, which provides that ''[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,'' appears to secure to the persons just made U.S. citizens (freed slaves) a certain collection of rights-''privileges or immunities'' in the parlance of the time-attributable to that status. This broad notion of freedom recognized certain fundamental freedoms that inhered in the newly ratified definition of citizenship.
Thomas noted that the Supreme Court's ''marginalization'' of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases, and the ''circular'' reasoning of United States v. Cruikshank constituted the ''Court's last word'' for over a century, and ''in the intervening years'' the Court held that the clause protected ''only a handful of rights . . . that are not readily described as essential to liberty.
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Following these flawed precedents, ''litigants seeking federal protection of fundamental rights turned to'' the Due Process Clause-a ''most curious place''-in order to find ''an alternative fount of such rights. '' 124 Over time, the Court ''conclude[d] that certain Bill of Rights guarantees,'' both substantive and procedural rights, ''were sufficiently fundamental to fall within § 1's guarantee of 'due process'''-though the Court ''has long struggled to define'' the term ''fundamental. '' 125 Justice Thomas criticized the disparate standard the Court has used to recognize ''fundamental'' rights, spanning from the Glucksberg ''deeply rooted'' test to the ''less measurable range of criteria'' of Lawrence v. Texas that recognized the nebulous protection of ''liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions. '' 126 Taking an intrinsically originalist perspective, Thomas noted that neither the plurality nor the dissents even bother ''argu[ing] the meaning they attribute to the Due Process Clause was consistent with public understanding at the time of its ratification.'' 127 Refusing to ''accept a theory of constitutional interpretation that rests on such tenuous footing,'' Thomas opined that the ''original meaning of the . . . [Privileges or Immunities Clause] offers a superior alternative, and that a return to that meaning would allow this Court to enforce the rights the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to protect with greater clarity and predictability than the substantive due process framework has so far managed. '' 128 Acknowledging the ''importance of stare decisis,'' Justice Thomas noted that while significant number of cases have ''been built upon the substantive due process framework,'' stare decisis is not ''an 123 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3060-61 (Thomas, J., concurring) (''In other words, the reason the Framers codified the right to bear arms in the Second Amendment-its nature as an inalienable right that pre-existed the Constitution's adoption-was the very reason citizens could not enforce it against States through the Fourteenth.''). See also Saenz v. Roe , 526 U. S. 489, 503 (1999 Thomas concluded that the ''right to keep and bear arms was understood to be a privilege of American citizenship guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.'' 140 The Privileges or Immunities Clause is not a mere anti-discrimination principle, but ''establishes a minimum baseline of federal rights, and the constitutional right to keep and bear arms plainly was among them. '' 141 Justice Thomas conceded that while his understanding is ''contrary to this Court's precedents,'' ''stare decisis is only an 'adjunct' of our duty as judges to decide by our best lights what the Constitution means,'' and so considered whether ''stare decisis requires retention of those precedents. '' 142 He also cabined his analysis to the right to keep and bear arms-and expressly declined to evaluate the larger scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Further, ''the right to keep and bear arms was essential to the preservation of liberty'' and the Framers and the ratifying-era public ''deemed this right necessary to include in the minimum baseline of federal rights that the Privileges or Immunities Clause established in the wake of the War over slavery. '' 143 As to Slaughterhouse, Thomas criticized the case for ''interpreting the rights of state and federal citizenship as mutually exclusive.'' The Slaughterhouse majority had limited federal rights to a ''handful'' of rights that excluded rights of state citizenship. 144 But those latter, the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, . . . some by the first eight amendments of the Constitution,'' and that ''there is no power given in the Constitution to enforce and to carry out any of these guarantees'' against the states). 138 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3084 (Thomas, J., concurring) (''Both proponents and opponents of this Act described it as providing the 'privileges' of citizenship to freedmen, and defined those privileges to include constitutional rights, such as the right to keep and bear arms.''). 139 Id. at 3084 (The Freedmen's Bureau Act ''entitled all citizens to the 'full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty' and 'personal security.' The Act stated expressly that the rights of personal liberty and security protected by the Act 'includ[ed] the constitutional right to bear arms.''') ( 
D. Justice Stevens's Valedictory Dissent
Justice Stevens, in one of his last public acts as a member of the Court, found that the Second Amendment did not protect a fundamental right, that even if it were fundamental it should not be incorporated, and that even if it were incorporated, it need not be protected equally at the state and federal levels. Stevens, who described incorporation as a ''misnomer,'' 155 adopted the second Justice John Marshall Harlan's view that ''the Court's usual approach has been to ground the prohibitions against state action squarely on due process, without intermediate reliance on any of the first eight Amendments. '' 156 Relying on Justice Harlan's dissent in Duncan, Stevens argued it was ''circular'' to incorporate only rights ''deeply rooted in our history'' because ''state actors have already been according the most extensive protection'' to those same rights.
the Glucksberg inquiry as ''countenanc[ing] the most revolting past injustices in the name of continuity,'' such as ''slavery'' and the ''subjugation of women and other rank forms of discrimination. '' 159 In a somewhat confusing closing, Justice Stevens noted that the Glucksberg test is ''judicial abdication in the guise of judicial modesty.'' 160 But it would seem that the justices abdicating their judicial role are those willing to delegate the interpretation of the Constitution to the City of Chicago and eschew federal judicial enforcement of the right to bear arms. The faux judicial modesty belongs to Stevens, and not the Court.
E. Justice Breyer's Multi-Factor Balancing Dissent
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion makes several points: First, like Stevens, Breyer briefly reopened the Heller debate by outlining his contrary version of the text and history of the right to keep and bear arms. Unlike Stevens's competing originalism, however, Breyer prefers his own (ahistorical) theory of ''active liberty'' to interpret the Constitution. Second, again somewhat like Stevens, Breyer would hold that the Second Amendment right to ''private self defense'' is not ''fundamental'' and should not be incorporated. That is, even ''taking Heller as a given''-something none of the dissenters apparently do, even though Justice Sotomayor accepted during her confirmation hearing just last year that Heller was ''settled law'' 161 -Justice Breyer contended that the majority ''fails'' to show that the right to keep and bear arms is ''fundamental to the American scheme of justice.'' 162 Third, Breyer seeks to distinguish the right to keep and bear arms from ''other forms of substantive liberty'' because the Second Amendment ''often puts others' lives at risk,'' and ''does not warrant federal constitutional regulation.'' 163 Finally, in an uncharacteristic paean to judicial minimalism, Breyer faults the majority for ''transferring ultimate regulatory authority over the private uses of firearms from democratically elected legislatures to courts or from the States to the Federal Government. '' 164 Continuing his disapproval of originalism, Justice Breyer remarked that ''in the incorporation context, as elsewhere, history often is unclear about the answers''-even though Justice Stevens's Heller dissent relies almost exclusively on history-and ''the historical status of a right is [not] the only relevant consideration. ' ' 165 Yet Breyer's preferred approach for determining whether a right is ''fundamental'' meanders even from established incorporation jurisprudence. Breyer seeks to consider a laundry list of factors, including ''the nature of the right; any contemporary disagreement about whether the right is fundamental; the extent to which incorporation will further other, perhaps more basic, constitutional aims; and the extent to which incorporation will advance or hinder the Constitution's structural aims, including its division of powers among different governmental institutions (and the people as well).'' 166 Questions of whether incorporation ''further[s] the Constitution's effort to ensure that the government treats each individual with equal respect'' and is consistent ''with the Constitution's efforts to create governmental institutions well suited to the carrying out of its constitutional promises'' are at the core of Breyer's approach to incorporation, one that seems inspired by ''redemptive constitutionalism'' that now constitutes the leading edge of progressive legal thought. 167 In any event, Justice Breyer's critique of originalism makes two crucial errors: First, like Justice Stevens in Heller, Breyer conflates ''original intent originalism''-which looks to constitutional framers' intent and ''motivations''-with ''original public meaning originalism''-the so-called New Originalism, which seeks to understand 163 Id. at 3120. 164 Id. 165 Id. at 3123. the semantic context of terms and how they were understood by the public at the time of ratification. 168 While the former has been seriously discredited, largely by scholars on the left, the latter has gained general acceptance. Second, Breyer considers originalism at the wrong time. 169 While it was appropriate in Heller to consider the meaning of the right to keep and bear arms at the time of the Second Amendment's ratification, the correct timeframe for analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive protections is the Reconstruction era. Breyer mistakenly grounds his analysis in 1791 rather than 1868-when the self-defense interest was perhaps the strongest it has been in American history-concluding that ''the Framers did not write the Second Amendment in order to protect a private right of armed self-defense.''
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III. McDonald's Aftermath: Opening the Door to Liberty
The most common question about the state of the legal world after McDonald-no doubt what some readers of this article are looking for-relates to the future of ''gun rights.'' That is, what does this ''application of the Second Amendment to the states'' mean in practice and what kinds of lawsuits will be successful? Each of us, for example, is regularly asked by friends, colleagues, and public interlocutors to explain the scope of this individual right to keep and bear arms. 171 One of us (Gura) is counsel in various lawsuits challenging ''may issue'' gun-carry permit systems (which require individuals to justify their need or show ''good cause'' to exercise their Second Amendment right), 172 a gun-range ban, 173 handgunrostering schemes that turn legislators into gun designers, 174 and laws restricting access to arms during times of emergency. 175 Opinions citing McDonald in cases involving various municipal restrictions are already emerging from the lower courts 176 and the Ninth Circuit has specifically requested McDonald-related supplemental briefing in the continuing Nordyke saga. 177 But all this Second Amendment litigation is almost beside McDonald's point. Yes, the right at issue here-the one triggering, as it were, the fascinating seminar on incorporation doctrine-was one involving guns. But nowhere in McDonald will you find a discussion of the constitutionality of licensing or registration requirements, concealed-carry regimes, firearm-or ammunition-purchasing limits, automatic-rifle or ''assault-weapon'' prohibitions, or any of the myriad other issues at the heart of the legal and political battles over the future of gun regulations. Much like Heller-which decided ''only'' that the Second Amendment protected an individual right not connected to militia service-McDonald ''merely'' said that this right, whatever its scope, offered protection against all levels of government, not just the federal. In neither case did the Court even attempt to sketch the line between constitutional and unconstitutional gun laws. And that demurral is neither surprising nor disappointing; the Court simply didn't have to reach those issues to evaluate the claims made in the respective lawsuits. Most of these questions were provoked not by the plurality opinion, however, or even by the debate between the plurality and the dissents. And they do not flow from the simple fact that the Court incorporated the Second Amendment. Instead, it was Justice Thomas's lone concurrence that, by reanimating the Privileges or Immunities Clause and starting a jurisprudential discourse on that clause's meaning, resurrected the old idea that we possess certain ''unalienable rights.'' In stirring passages detailing the state oppressions rampant before and after the Civil War, Thomas showed the reasons for, first, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and, soon after, the Fourteenth Amendment. Freed slaves needed guns to defend themselves against pervasive threats to life and liberty, to be sure-which is partly why extending the right to keep and bear arms is vitally important-but they also needed the freedom to secure employment in a variety of professions, to keep the fruits of their labors, to engage in economic transactions, and a host of other rights that in the parlance of the day were called privileges or immunities. These sorts of rights do not appear explicitly in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, but in reviewing explanatory documents like the speeches of the amendment's framers and ratifiers, and sources such as Corfield v. Coryell, one finds that those unenumerated rights were very much understood to be constitutionally protected.
What makes
It is thus that Justice Thomas's forceful and scholarly opinion will influence litigation that has nothing to do with guns or the Second Amendment but with unenumerated rights-and especially the economic liberties that Slaughterhouse disparaged and that were subverted by the infamous Carolene Products footnote four.
179 Every complaint challenging the host of capricious laws impeding the fundamental right to earn an honest living-such as arbitrary licensing restrictions (typically sought by the very industry the law is supposed to be regulating) and other irrational barriers to entrywill now cite Thomas's McDonald concurrence. His opinion will also strengthen future challenges to the pervasive regulatory state that has exploded in recent years. When you think about it-and quite apart from the over-arching question of where the government gets the expansive power it asserts-legislation such as TARP and ObamaCare offends a host of unenumerated rights as well.
Significantly, even though Justice Alito did not adopt Justice Thomas's approach, he took great pains in his plurality opinion not to reject or criticize it (as did, for that matter, Justices Stevens and Breyer in their dissents). McDonald as a whole thus represents a crucial first step down the path to constitutional liberty and opens the door to reviving a powerful constitutional provision. Thomas's clarion call for a liberty-focused originalism provides a foundation on which to build.
In the annals of Supreme Court history, solo or minority opinions that introduce novel ideas often start a trickle of discussions. These arguments swirl and strengthen, and over time flow into a sea change in constitutional law. Look no further than the first Justice John Marshall Harlan's opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, which argued that separate is not equal. Harlan's lone dissent culminated in Brown v. Board of Education. Or consider Justice Owen Roberts's opinion for 179 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (subjecting to higher scrutiny legislative actions relating to ''specific prohibitions of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,'' as well as those affecting ''discrete and insular minorities''). Ironically, Chicago's handgun ban implicated just such a specific constitutional prohibition-the Second Amendment. Both dissenting opinions somehow missed this in arguing that gun-control regulations do not demand of judges a searching inquiry. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3116 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (''[T]his is not a case, then, that involves a 'special condition' that 'may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.''') (citing Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153, n.4.); id. at 3125 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (''We are aware of no argument that gun-control regulations target or are passed with the purpose of targeting 'discrete and insular minorities.' '') (citing Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153, n.4).
